Surveillance, Facial Recognition & Location Tracking

SURVEILLANCE, FACIAL RECOGNITION & LOCATION TRACKING

Limited Right to Privacy in Public

Public Visibility Is Not Consent to Persistent Surveillance

A person entering a public place may reasonably expect to be seen, photographed incidentally, or observed by others.

That should not automatically mean the person has consented to being:

• continuously tracked;

• repeatedly photographed for identification;

• biometrically identified;

• followed across locations;

• placed into a movement database;

• profiled over time;

• monitored through automated camera networks;

• commercially tracked and sold as location data.

The law should distinguish ordinary observation from persistent surveillance.

Persistent Tracking of Individuals

No government agency, business, organization, or private individual should be permitted to systematically track another person's movements over an extended period without:

• consent;

• a legitimate legal purpose;

• or appropriate judicial authorization where applicable.

Factors should include:

• duration;

• frequency;

• use of automated technology;

• number of locations tracked;

• whether identity was established;

• whether records were stored;

• whether surveillance served a legitimate security or investigative purpose.

Repeatedly following and documenting another person's movements without legitimate purpose may constitute stalking even when individual observations occurred in public.

Automated Surveillance Networks

Automated systems capable of identifying and following individuals across multiple locations should be regulated.

This includes:

• automated license-plate readers;

• facial recognition;

• connected camera networks;

• location-data brokers;

• geofencing systems;

• drone surveillance;

• mobile-device tracking;

• connected-vehicle data.

A business should not be able to build a detailed history of a person's movements merely because each individual observation happened in public.

Private Companies and Movement Data

Companies that collect or purchase movement data should be prohibited from selling or sharing identifiable historical location information without meaningful consent, except where specifically authorized by law.

Heightened protection should apply to visits involving:

• homes;

• medical facilities;

• counseling;

• houses of worship;

• political meetings;

• protests;

• union activity;

• legal offices;

• schools;

• gun stores;

• other sensitive locations.

Private Individuals and Stalking

A private person should remain free to:

• take ordinary photographs;

• record public events;

• document crimes;

• engage in journalism;

• conduct legitimate investigations;

• observe their own property.

However, repeatedly tracking or monitoring an identifiable person in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety, suffer substantial emotional distress, or experience serious invasion of personal autonomy may constitute stalking or unlawful surveillance.

Use of technology to automate that conduct should not make it lawful.

Anti-Stalking Technology Rule

Using:

• GPS trackers;

• AirTags or similar devices;

• plate-reader databases;

• spyware;

• facial-recognition systems;

• drones;

• connected cameras;

• location-data purchases

to persistently monitor another person without authorization should be unlawful where the conduct exceeds ordinary observation and lacks a legitimate purpose.

Penalties should increase where surveillance is used for:

• harassment;

• intimidation;

• domestic abuse;

• extortion;

• identity theft;

• burglary planning;

• political retaliation;

• employment retaliation;

• discrimination.

Business Security Cameras

Businesses may use cameras to protect:

• employees;

• customers;

• property;

• inventory;

• entrances;

• parking lots.

But ordinary security footage should not automatically become part of a commercial national tracking network.

Sharing or selling identifiable movement records beyond the security purpose for which they were collected should require separate legal authority or meaningful consent.

Residential Cameras

Homeowners may use reasonable cameras to protect their own property.

However, intentionally configuring cameras primarily to conduct persistent intrusive surveillance of neighbors' private property or daily activities may be restricted.

Recording areas ordinarily visible from public spaces is different from using technology specifically to invade private spaces or systematically monitor another household.

Facial Recognition by Private Businesses

Private businesses should not use facial recognition to continuously identify and track ordinary customers across unrelated locations without clear notice and meaningful consent.

Limited uses may remain lawful for:

• device authentication;

• building access;

• fraud prevention;

• narrowly defined security functions.

Businesses should not secretly build biometric movement histories of the public.

No Sale of Stalking Capability

Data brokers should not sell products that allow ordinary purchasers to enter a person's identity and obtain a detailed history of that individual's movements.

Access to highly granular historical location data should be restricted to:

• the individual themselves;

• authorized users;

• legitimate regulated purposes;

• valid legal process.

Journalistic and Public-Interest Protection

The law should not prohibit legitimate:

• journalism;

• documentation of public officials performing public duties;

• recording police;

• news gathering;

• investigations of wrongdoing;

• public-interest research.

The distinction is between gathering information about matters of public concern and persistently tracking a private person's life without legitimate purpose.

Consent

Meaningful consent for persistent tracking should be:

• informed;

• specific;

• revocable;

• not buried inside unrelated terms and conditions.

A company should not treat acceptance of a 70-page user agreement as unlimited permission to track a person's physical movements forever.

Right to Delete Location Histories

Individuals should generally be able to require private companies to delete identifiable movement histories that are no longer necessary for:

• a requested service;

• security;

• fraud prevention;

• legal compliance.

Lawful preservation orders and genuine legal obligations may override deletion temporarily.

Core MPA Principle

A person does not surrender personal autonomy merely by entering public space.

Ordinary observation is part of life in society.

Persistent identification, aggregation, storage, and reconstruction of a person's movements is fundamentally different.

Government, corporations, and private individuals should not be permitted to create detailed histories of another person's life without consent, legitimate necessity, or lawful process.

Technology should not turn ordinary observation into permanent stalking.

Automated License Plate Readers and the Police Surveillance State

No Continuous Government Tracking of Innocent Americans

Government should not build a system that continuously records and reconstructs the movements of ordinary Americans merely because they use public roads.

Automated license plate readers, facial-recognition systems, vehicle cameras, mobile-device location tools, and similar technology must remain investigative tools rather than becoming infrastructure for universal population tracking.

License Plate Reader Limits

Automated plate readers may be used for narrow legitimate purposes such as identifying:

• stolen vehicles;

• vehicles associated with serious wanted suspects;

• Amber Alerts;

• immediate public-safety threats.

They should not create an indefinite historical database of everyone's movements.

Short Retention by Default

License-plate records involving vehicles not connected to an active investigation or valid alert should be automatically deleted after a short statutory period.

Extended retention should require a documented lawful investigative basis.

Warrant for Historical Tracking

Searching historical location records to reconstruct an identifiable person's extended movements should generally require a warrant based on probable cause, subject to genuine emergency exceptions.

No Fishing Expeditions

Police should not search nationwide plate databases merely to determine:

• who attended a lawful political rally;

• who visited a church;

• who attended a gun show;

• who went to an abortion clinic;

• who visited a political organization;

• who participated in lawful protest;

• who associated with lawful groups.

Protected activity cannot become the basis for surveillance.

No National Movement Database

Federal, state, local, and private surveillance networks should not be combined into a permanent searchable database capable of reconstructing the everyday movements of Americans without individualized legal process.

Audit Logs

Every government search of a surveillance database should record:

• officer;

• agency;

• date;

• purpose;

• case number or lawful justification;

• records accessed.

Audit records should be protected against alteration.

Independent Audits

Independent oversight bodies should regularly audit:

• searches;

• retention;

• sharing;

• misuse;

• unauthorized access.

Intentional misuse for stalking, political surveillance, personal purposes, retaliation, or harassment should carry serious penalties.

Human Verification

Automated alerts should not alone establish probable cause for arrest or dangerous police action.

Officers should reasonably verify machine-generated matches before acting whenever circumstances permit.

Private Surveillance Contractors

Government should not evade constitutional protections by purchasing surveillance capabilities or historical movement data from private companies that government itself could not lawfully collect without appropriate process.

Facial Recognition

Government facial recognition should be limited to defined investigative purposes.

It should not become continuous facial tracking of everyone moving through ordinary public life.

A facial-recognition match should be treated as an investigative lead rather than conclusive proof of identity.

Related policies: Privacy Rights; Personal Data & Records Rights; Search Warrants, Raids & Home Entry; Law Enforcement; Connected Vehicles, Privacy & Remote Control.

Status: Proposed / Draft — not yet formally adopted.

Originally published: August 15, 2026.

Last updated: September 25, 2026.

Version: Draft 0.1.