China, Taiwan & Indo-Pacific Strategy
PROPOSED / DRAFT: CHINA, TAIWAN & INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY
POSITION
The United States should deter war, defend its constitutional and economic security, protect allies and lawful commerce, and reduce dangerous dependence on the government of the People's Republic of China without treating Chinese or Chinese-American people as enemies. Policy should target state-directed conduct, military risk, coercion, espionage, forced labor, and unfair economic practices.
TAIWAN AND DETERRENCE
The United States should oppose any unilateral attempt to change Taiwan's status through invasion, blockade, coercion, or other force.
Defensive assistance should prioritize mobile air and coastal defense, resilient communications, cyber defense, stockpiles, civil defense, rapid repair, and the ability to withstand a blockade or initial attack.
Major arms commitments must include delivery schedules, training, sustainment, accountability, and reports on delayed systems.
The United States should conduct regular planning with allies for evacuation, humanitarian support, trade disruption, cyberattack, and protection of regional bases and shipping.
Crisis hotlines and military communication should remain available to reduce miscalculation. No president may begin a major war outside immediate lawful defense without the constitutional participation of Congress.
SEMICONDUCTORS, AI, AND SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY
Export controls should focus on technology with a documented material connection to advanced military systems, intelligence, mass surveillance, cyber operations, or weapons development rather than ordinary consumer trade.
Licensing decisions must identify the controlled technology, national-security basis, covered end users, duration, allied coordination, and review date.
Companies and researchers receive clear rules, protection for lawful fundamental research, a process to request licenses, and an appeal from erroneous designation.
Federal grants, tax benefits, and contracts supporting sensitive semiconductor or AI capacity must include restrictions against transferring the subsidized capability to a covered state-controlled entity and clawbacks for knowing violations.
Control lists must be reviewed at least annually so obsolete restrictions expire and newly demonstrated threats can be addressed.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC OWNERSHIP
An entity materially owned, controlled, or directed by the PRC government, Chinese Communist Party, or the People's Liberation Army should not control designated United States military suppliers, ports, electric-grid control systems, core telecommunications networks, sensitive data infrastructure, or other specifically designated critical infrastructure. Control includes ownership, voting power, board appointment, contractual direction, or access capable of creating a demonstrated security risk.
Covered acquisitions require national-security review before closing.
A prohibition or divestment order must identify the evidence, affected asset, security risk, corrective action, deadline, and route to independent review.
Restrictions apply based on control and risk, not ethnicity, national origin, or lawful ordinary investment.
Federal contractors handling sensitive systems must disclose covered ownership, direction, and material subcontractors and must report a material change within 30 days.
SUPPLY CHAINS, MANUFACTURING, AND CRITICAL MINERALS
The federal government must publish an annual dependency assessment for defense goods, semiconductors, medicines, energy equipment, telecommunications, and critical minerals.
Each high-risk dependency must have a measurable diversification plan using domestic capacity and reliable allies, with milestones, responsible agencies, cost estimates, and annual progress reporting.
Federal procurement should avoid sole-source dependence on a covered state-controlled supplier for a designated critical item when a practical alternative exists.
Emergency waivers must be written, time limited, and accompanied by a plan to end the dependency.
CYBER OPERATIONS, ESPIONAGE, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The United States should investigate and prosecute theft of trade secrets, hacking, covert technology transfer, bribery, and espionage under neutral laws requiring proof of individual conduct.
A company or institution receiving federal sensitive-research funds must maintain access controls, conflict disclosures, incident reporting, and protection against unauthorized transfer of controlled information.
Verified state-directed cyber operations may trigger targeted sanctions, exclusion from federal contracting, asset restrictions, diplomatic action, and proportionate defensive cyber measures authorized by law.
No person may be investigated, excluded, or treated as disloyal merely because of Chinese ancestry, language, family relationships, academic field, or lawful contact with China.
TRADE, FORCED LABOR, AND ECONOMIC COERCION
Imports credibly linked to forced labor must be detained under law. Importers must have access to the evidence that can lawfully be disclosed and an opportunity to prove lawful sourcing through traceable records.
Tariffs and trade restrictions must identify the targeted conduct, expected security or economic objective, estimated consumer and producer effects, retaliation risk, duration, and conditions for removal.
Broad restrictions that impose substantial costs without advancing the stated objective must be revised or ended. Enforcement should focus on state subsidies, dumping, theft, coercive technology transfer, sanctions evasion, and other documented unfair conduct.
Federal agencies must report major economic-coercion incidents against American companies and allies and coordinate lawful collective responses where practical.
SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ALLIED COOPERATION
The United States should protect lawful freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with international law and should conduct operations with clear rules intended to avoid unnecessary escalation.
Defense agreements and major regional commitments must state partner responsibilities, readiness expectations, consultation procedures, escalation risks, and congressional reporting requirements.
The United States should expand joint maritime awareness, cyber defense, logistics, coast-guard cooperation, and disaster response with willing regional partners.
Military deployments must serve defined deterrence and defense objectives and remain subject to civilian oversight and constitutional war powers.
FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Individuals and organizations acting under the direction or control of the PRC government or another foreign government to influence United States policy must disclose that relationship under neutral rules based on direction, financing, agency, and concealed influence. Lawful speech, journalism, research, cultural exchange, student activity, and ordinary advocacy remain protected.
IMPLEMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT
The President must submit an annual China strategy to Congress identifying major military, cyber, trade, technology, supply-chain, forced-labor, influence, and alliance risks; actions taken; costs; results; unmet milestones; and proposed changes. A bipartisan congressional commission and the relevant Inspectors General should audit classified and unclassified implementation.
Success should be judged by deterrence of coercion, delivery of defensive capabilities, reduced critical dependencies, domestic and allied capacity, enforcement against proven espionage and forced labor, cyber resilience, allied burden sharing, trade effects, and whether restrictions remain tied to demonstrated risks.
Related policies: Foreign Affairs; Military; Trade & Manufacturing; Artificial Intelligence, Synthetic Media & Automated Accounts; Data Centers & Digital Infrastructure; Privacy Rights.
Status: Proposed / Draft — not yet formally adopted.
Originally published: September 25, 2026.
Last updated: September 25, 2026.
Version: Draft 0.2.